Is there no way you could summarize your position? I am a slow
reader, so it would definitely be appreciated if you could.
Okeyday.
SummaryPresident/Prime Minister should have power to dissolve Congress because:
1) The Executive should be able to, when in deadlock with Congress, appeal to the People (through elections) for the justness of his measures (this prevents executive/legislative deadlock),
2) If no party has a strong coalition/majority in Congress, Congress will not pass necessary measures for fear of lack of support,
3) It makes the House more careful in its encroachments on the Executive branch.
Furthermore, the Pres. requires the consent of the Prime Minister and the speakers/pres. of both houses of legislature in order to dissolve the House. Quite difficult unless there is great need for it to happen.
Also, dissolution may not be made within a year of the previous dissolution's re-election. Thus, the power of dissolution is limited even further.
Non-Summary, but select portion's of Mill"There is another mode of giving the head of the administration... independence of the Legislature... He never could be unduly dependent on a vote of Parliament if he had... the power to dissolve the House and appeal to the people... There ought
not to be any possibility of that deadlock in politics which would ensue on a quarrel breaking out between a president and an assembly, neither of whom, during an interval which might amount to years,
would have any legal means of ridding itself of the other. To get through such a period without a coup d'état being attempted... requires such a combination of the love of liberty and the habit of self-restraint as very few nations have yet shown... Such a spirit (of liberty) may exist, but even where it does there is imprudence in trying it too far.
Other reasons make it desirable that some power in the state... should have the liberty of at any time (to call) a new Parliament. When there is a real
doubt which of two contending parties (in Congress) has the strongest following, it is
important that there should exist a constitutional means of immediately testing the point and setting it at rest. (No political bills/topics have) a chance of being properly attended to while this is undecided; and such an interval... (will prevent any party from attempting un-popular but necessary measures, for fear of lack of legislative support).
I have not taken account of the case in which the vast power centralized in the chief magistrate... give him a chance of success in an attempt to subvert the Constitution, and usurp sovereign power. Where such peril exists, (all magistrates must be able to be thrown out by Parliament with a single vote)."